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Abstract
Norbert Wiener and J.B.S. Haldane suggested during the early thir-
ties that the profound changes in our conception of matter entailed by
quantum theory opens the way for our thoughts, and other experiential
or mind-like qualities, to play a role in nature that is causally interactive
and effective, rather than purely epiphenomenal, as required by classical
mechanics. The mathematical basis of this suggestion is described here,
and it is then shown how, by giving mind this efficacious role in natural
process, the classical character of our perceptions of the quantum universe
can be seen to be a consequence of evolutionary pressures for the survival
of the species.
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I. Introduction
This session of the congress is entitled “Leibniz, Haldane, and Wiener on
Mind”. Accordingly, my talk will deal with issues that are often considered
to be more philosophical than mathematical. However, the logical basis of my
remarks is the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics.
I introduce the subject by giving some quotations from Haldane’s article
“Quantum mechanics as a Basis for Philosophy”1, from Wiener’s article “The
Role of the Observer”,2 and from Bohm’s Commentary3 in the Collected Works
of Norbert Wiener.
Haldane:
1. Biologists have as yet taken but little cognizance of the revolution in human
thought which has been inaugurated by physicists in the last five years,
and philosophers have stressed its negative rather than its positive side.
2. If mind is to be regarded as expressive of the wholeness of the body, or even
of the brain, it should probably be thought of as a resonance phenomenon,
in fact part of the wave-like aspect of things.
3. If mind is a resonance phenomenon it is at once clear why it cannot be
definitely located, either in space or time, though it is obviously enough
connected with definite events in a definite material structure.
4. But it is, I think, of importance that philosophers, and even ordinary
persons, should realize that a thorough-going materialism is compatible
with the view that mind has many of the essential properties attributed
to it by metaphysicians. The theory here presented does not reduce it to
an epiphenomenon of matter, but exhibits it as a reality interacting with
ordinary material systems.
5. It has been my object to suggest that the progress of modern physics has
made such a unified view more readily attainable than appeared likely ten
years ago.
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Wiener:
1. The Platonist believes in a world of essence, of cleanly defined ideas and
cleanly defined propositions concerning these ideas, into which we may
enter as spectators, but never as participants. They are out of time, and
time is irrelevant to them.
This is pure dogma, and does not check with what we should naively ex-
pect. Of course, our experiences must have some reference outside them-
selves, in the sense that they cannot be considered as completely closed
and isolated. Otherwise there could be no knowledge at all. This by no
means asserts that the experience has a reference entirely unaltered by our
participation.
2. Thus physics, the most exact of all sciences, has had to have a thorough
logical housecleaning. We no longer conceive the laws of physics to apply
to some mystical world of reality behind our observations and instruments:
they merely constitute an intelligible statement of the manner in which our
observations and the readings of our instruments hang together.
3. The philosophy of Hume furnishes the dreadful example of what happens
to an empiricism which seeks its fundamental reality in the fugitive sense-
data of immediate experience. If the raw stuff of our experience does not
contain something of a universal nature, no manipulation can ever evoke
anything which might even be mistaken for a universal.
4. Science is the explanation of process. It is neither possible under a ra-
tionalism, which does not recognize the reality of process, nor under an
empiricism, which does not recognize the reality of explanation.
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Bohm:
1. In [36G] Wiener goes into the role of the observer, which has been empha-
sized in the quantum theory. He points out that in art, drama, psychology,
and medicine we are all familiar with areas of experience in which the ob-
server is not merely a passive receiver of perceptions but, on the contrary,
plays an active and essential role in all that is seen.
Wiener proposes that in physics and mathematics a similar approach is
now called for. We do not ask for a mystical world of reality behind our
observations. Physics is a coherent way of describing the results of our
observations and what is done with them.
2. .... in all his thinking Wiener has consistently and coherently sought to
achieve what he already indicated in the earliest of his papers on the
quantum theory, i.e. something that “possesses more of an intrinsic logical
necessity” than is possessed by already existing modes of thoughts.
These quotations highlight the fact that the discovery of quantum mechan-
ics has opened up the possibility that mind - - - i.e., the realm of experiential
things, such as our thoughts, ideas, and perceptions - - - may not be epiphenom-
enal after all: mind may be something quite different from the causally inert
by-product of the microscopically specified and determined mechanical processes
in our brains (or bodies) that the principles of classical mechanics require it to
be.
This possibility that mind is an interactive and dynamically efficacious as-
pect of nature, not reducible to the locally determined mechanical features that
characterize the “matter” of classical physics, arises from the circumstance that
quantum dynamics has an element of wholeness that is not reducible to those
local aspects of nature, but that rather complements them, and interacts with
them. This added element is directly tied to our thoughts by the basic rules of
quantum mechanics.
During the twenties and thirties our detailed scientific understanding of
brain processes, and their connection to our thoughts, was too rudimentary to
allow this possibility offered by quantum mechanics to be related to empirical
findings. Now, however, we are entering a period of intensive empirical scruting
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of brain processes and their connections to thoughts. In this new climate the fact
that quantum mechanics provides a scientifically based mathematical setting
that allows mind to complement and interact with the aspect of nature that
characterizes the “matter” of classical mechanics has become the basis of a line
of research that is being aggressively pursued. This paper presents some recent
results in this area, but begins by describing the situation as it was understood
in the thirties.
The most orthodox interpretation of quantum theory is the one formulated
by Niels Bohr. It was radical in its time because it rejected the prevailing
idea that the ultimate task of science was to develop a mathematical model
of the universe. Quantum philosophy asserted that the proper task of science
was merely to formulate rules that allow us to calculate all of the verifiable
relationships among our experiences. According to Bohr:
“In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence
of phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the
multifold aspects of our experience.”4
and
“Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics merely
offers rules of calculation for the deduction of expectations about observations
obtained under well defined experimental conditions specified by classical phys-
ical concepts.”5
The format for using quantum theory is as follows:
Let A be a classical description of an experimental set up.
Let B be a classical description of a possible outcome of this experiment.
By a “classical description” Bohr means a description in terms of ordinary
language, elaborated by the concepts of classical physics. It is a description
of what the technicians who set up the experiment should do, and what the
observers who observe the results of the experiment might see, or otherwise
experience.
A mapping from these “classical descriptions” to quantum operators is de-
fined, essentially by calibrations of the devices:
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A =⇒ ρA (1.1a)
B =⇒ PB. (1.1b)
Here ρA is the density operator (or statistical operator) that corresponds to
the classical description A, and PB is the projection operator (i.e., P
2
B = PB)
that is the Hilbert space representation of the outcome specified by the classical
description B. The basic quantum postulate is that the probability P (B;A)
that an outcome that satisfies the specifications B will occur under conditions
that satisfy the specifications A is given by
P (B;A) = TrPBρA, (1.2)
where Tr is the trace operator in Hilbert space:
TrX =
∑
i
< i|X|i >, (1.3)
Here the index i labels the vectors of a complete orthonormal basis:
< i|j >= δij =
{
1 for i = j
0 for i 6= j (1.4a)
and ∑
i
|i >< i| = I. (1.4b)
The symbol I repesents the identity operator defined by I|X >= |X > for
all |X >. (If the detectors are not 100% efficient then the operator PB must
be replaced by an efficiency operator, eB, but I shall ignore here this possible
complication, in order to focus on the central points.)
Notice that there is no mention here of any “collapse of the wave function”
or “reduction of the wave packet” or “quantum jump”. (See below.) Notice
also that the formulation is pragmatic: it is a description of how to use the
theory; and the basic realities in the description are the experiences of the human
beings who set up experiments and observe their outcomes. The objectivity of
the theory is secured by formulating the specifications on the preparations and
observations in terms of the “objective” language of classical description: there is
no greater dependence here on individual human beings than there is in classical
physics.
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A principal feature of a classical description is that objects and properties
are assigned to locations that are definite, at least at the level of our perceptions:
the center of an observable “pointer” that indicates the outcome specified by
a measuring device does not lie simultaneously at two locations that can be
perceived to be different. The whole idea of a measurement, or of an experiment,
refers here to things that can be perceived.
Einstein, and many other scientists, objected to this introduction of hu-
man observers into the formulation of the basic physical theory. According to
Einstein:
“Physics is an attempt to conceptually grasp reality as it is thought indepen-
dently of its being observed.”6
and
“It is my opinion that contemporary quantum mechanics constitutes an optimum
formulation of [certain] connections but forms no useful point of departure for
future developments.”7
As regards “future developments” one may mention biological systems.
Quantum theoretical ideas are important in describing and understanding the
properties of the tissues of biological systems. However, living systems cannot be
isolated from their environment. Yet the orthodox formulation of quantum the-
ory demands that the observed system, which is the one represented in Hilbert
space, be isolated from the observing system, which consists of the observers,
their devices, and all systems coupled to them, between the time of preparation
of the observed system and the time of its observation. Bohr himself stressed8
that this idealization cannot be achieved for biological systems, and that the
scope of quantum theory, as he interpreted it, was correspondingly limited.
This isolation requirement fails also for cosmological system, because in this
context the observers are inside the quantum system that is the object of study,
and hence cannot be isolated from it.
John von Neumann, in his book9 “Mathematical Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics” examined the measurement problem, which is precisely the problem
of specifying the connection between an observed system and the observing
one. He started from the assumption, quite contrary to that of Bohr, that the
entire system of observed and observer should be treated within the quantum
6
formalism. His main result is easy to state.
Suppose we have a sequence of systems such that the first system is some
atomic system that might be in a state ψ11; that might be in a state ψ12; or
that might be in a superposed state aψ11 + bψ12, with |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. Suppose
the second system is a measuring device that measures whether the first system
is in state ψ11 or ψ12, in the sense that if the first system is originally in state
ψ11 and the second system is originally in some state ψ20 then the combined
system, originally ψ11 ⊗ ψ20, will evolve, due to the interaction between the
two systems, into a state ψ′11 ⊗ ψ21; whereas if the first system is originally in
the state ψ12, instead of ψ11, then the combined original system ψ12 ⊗ ψ20 will
evolve into the state ψ′12 ⊗ ψ22, where ψ22 represents a state of the device that
is perceptually different from the state represented by ψ21, so that an observer,
by seeing whether the second system (the measuring device) is in state ψ21 or
ψ22, can unambiguously infer whether the atomic system was originally in the
state ψ11 or ψ12.
The linear nature of the law of evolution of the full quantum system consist-
ing of the first and second systems ensures that if the first system had originally
been in the state (aψ11+ bψ12), and the combined system had originally been in
the state (aψ11+ bψ12)⊗ψ20, then this original state would evolve into the state
ψ = aψ′11 ⊗ ψ21 + bψ′12 ⊗ ψ22.
But this state has a part corresponding to each of the two macroscopically distin-
guishable configurations of the device: e.g., it has a part, ψ21, that corresponds,
for example, to the pointer’s having swung to the left, and it has a part, ψ22,
that corresponds, for example, to the pointer’s having swung to the right. The
general possibility (in principle) of exhibiting interference effects involving both
terms of any superposition of states means that the two terms in the super-
position ψ must be combined as a conjunction (both parts must be present in
nature) rather than as a disjunction (only one part or the other is present in
nature). Yet only one or the other position of the pointer is ever observed,
not both simultaneously. But then how does the “and” combination become
transformed to an “or” combination?
To examine this problem von Neumann introduces a sequence of measuring
devices, with each one set up to distinguish the two outcome states of the imme-
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diately preceding one in the sequence. The previous argument now generalizes:
the original state
Ψ10 = ψ11 ⊗ ψ20 ⊗ ψ30 ⊗ ...⊗ ψN0 (1.5a)
will evolve into
Ψ1 = ψ
′
11 ⊗ ψ21 ⊗ ψ31 ⊗ ...⊗ ψN1, (1.5b)
whereas the original state
Ψ20 = ψ12 ⊗ ψ20 ⊗ ...⊗ ψN0. (1.5c)
will evolve into
Ψ2 = ψ
′
12 ⊗ ψ22 ⊗ ψ32 ⊗ ...⊗ ψN2. (1.5d)
But then the linearity of the equation of motion ensures that the original state
Ψ0 = (aψ11 + bψ12)⊗ ψ20 ⊗ ψ30 ⊗ ...⊗ ψN0 (1.5e)
will evolve into
Ψ = aψ′11 ⊗ ψ21 ⊗ ψ31 ⊗ ...⊗ ψN1
+ bψ′12 ⊗ ψ22 ⊗ ψ32 ⊗ ...⊗ ψN2. (1.5f)
The wave functions ψN1 and ψN2 are taken to be the wave functions of the
parts of the brain that are the brain correlates of the experiences of the human
observer, in the two alternative possible cases defined by Ψ1 and Ψ2. Thus ψN1
would represent the brain correlate of the experience of seeing a device outcome
that indicates that the original state of the atom was ψ11, whereas ψN2 would
represent the brain correlate of the experience of seeing a device outcome that
indicates that the original state of the atom was ψ12. But then if the original
state of the atom were (aψ11 + bψ12), with a 6= 0 6= b, the final state of the
brain would have one component, ψN1, that corresponds to the experience of
seeing a device in a configuration that indicates that the original wave function
of the atom was ψ11, and another component, ψN2, that corresponds to the
experience of seeing a devices in a configuration that indicates that the original
wave function of the atom was ψ12. But how do we reconcile the fact that the
final state Ψ has two components corresponding to two different experiences,
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namely ψN1, which corresponds to seeing a pointer swung to the left, and ψN2,
which corresponds to seeing that pointer swung to the right, with the empirical
fact that only one or the other of the two possible experiences will actually
occur? How has the “and ” at the level of the device changed over to an “or ”
at the level of our experience.
The answer, if we apply the words of Bohr, arises from the assertion that
“In fact, wave mechanics, just as the matrix theory, represents on this view a
symbolic transcription of the problem of motion in classical mechanics adapted
to the requirements of quantum theory and only to be interpreted by an explicit
use of the quantum postulate.”10. (Italics mine.)
The mathematical core of the quantum postulate is the probability rule
(1.2):
P (B;A) = TrPBρA.
In our example the projection operator PB associated with the observation of
system n (1 ≤ n ≤ N) in state j(j = 1 or 2) is (in Dirac’s bra-ket notation)
Pnj = |ψnj >< ψnj | ×
∏
s 6=n
Is, (1.6)
where Is is the unit or identity operator in the Hilbert space associated with
system s. The |ψnj > are normalized so that
< ψnj |ψmℓ >= δnmδjℓ. (1.7)
The density operator for the final state, under the condition that the original
state of the atom is a|ψ11 > +b|ψ12 >, is
ρA = |Ψ >< Ψ|, (1.8a)
where [(1.5f) transcribed into Dirac’s notation]
|Ψ > = a|ψ′11 > ⊗|ψ21 > ⊗...⊗ |ψN1 >
+ b|ψ′12 > ⊗|ψ22 > ⊗...⊗ |ψN2 > . (1.8b)
Then, in the case that the measurement outcome B corresponds to finding the
system n (1 ≤ n ≤ N) in state j (j = 1 or 2), one obtains
P (B;A) = TrPnjρA
= |a|2 δ1j + |b|2 δ2j . (1.9)
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That is, the probability of the outcome j is either |a|2 or |b|2 according to whether
the value of j is 1 or 2, and this result is independent of which of the N possible
systems is specified by n: i.e., the probability for the outcome j is independent
of which one of the N systems is considered to be the “measured” or “observed”
one. Carrying the analysis up to the level of the brain correlate of the experience
does not change the computed probability.
By combining the ideas of von Neumann and Bohr in this way we have
resolved, in a certain sense, the measurement problem in a way that does not
automatically exclude biological or cosmological systems. In this development
the final system, system N , plays a special role: it provides the Hilbert space
in which is represented of the immediate objects of our experiences. These
experiences are the basis of Bohr’s approach. However, Bohr did not recommend
considering the brain correlate of the experience to be the directly experienced
system, as, following the approach of von Neumann, has been done here.
According to the ideas of Bohr, the Hilbert-space state should not be con-
sidered to characterize the objectively existing external reality itself; it is merely
a symbolic form that is to be used only to compute expectations that pertain
to classically describable experiences. Each of the two states ψN1 and ψN2 is
the brain correlate of a classically describable experience in which, for example,
a “pointer” of an observable device is located at a well defined position. But a
more general state such as aψN1 + bψN2, with a 6= 0 6= b, would evidently not
be the brain correlate of any single classically describable experience. Hence its
probability would not be something that it would be useful to compute: the “oc-
currence” of such an event would have no empirical meaning. The special role of
classical concepts in the formalism therefore arises, according to this viewpoint,
fundamentally from the circumstance that our perceptual experiences of the ex-
ternal world have, as a matter of empirical fact, aspects that can be described
in classical terms.
In this Bohr-type way of viewing the theory the Hilbert space quantities are
merely computational devices: the only accepted realities are the experiences of
the observers. Thus the approach is fundamentally idealistic.
We can retain these basic experiential realities yet expand our mathematical
representation of nature to include also a representation of the “physical” reality
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by adopting (with Heisenberg) the Aristotelian notion of “potentia”: i.e., by
conceiving the Hilbert-space state to be (or to faithfully represent) a reality that
constitutes not the “actual” realities in nature, which are events, but merely the
“potentia” for such actual events to occur. Then the Bohr-type experiential
realities can be retained as the “actual” things of nature, while the Hilbert-
space state becomes a representation of “objective tendencies” (in the words of
Heisenberg) for such actual events to occur.
The notion that the real actual things in nature should occur only in con-
junction with human brains is an idea that is too anthropocentric to be taken
seriously. Indeed, Heisenberg proposes that actual events should occur already
at the level of the first measuring device. However, as suggested already by
our simple example, there is no empirical evidence to support the intuitively
appealing notion that there are events at that purely mechanical level. That
conclusion is the basic message that comes from the numerous detailed elabora-
tions of von Neumann’s analysis that have been carried out over the years: the
simple example already exhibits the essential result.
In the present realistic approach the probability rule P (B;A) = TrPBρA is
interpreted as the probability that an event corresponding to B actually occurs
under the condition that the state of the universe is specified by ρA.
If we were adhering to the pragmatic Bohr-type philosophy then it might
be useful, for reasons of computational convenience, to push the level at which
the event is supposed to occur down to a level such that any shift to a higher
level will not change the computed probability significantly. But in a realistic
context the placement of the actual events ought to be be governed by a general
principle, not by reason of its practical convenience.
Putting aside, temporarily, this question of where to place any actual events
that might occur outside the brain, let us focus on processes occurring inside
human brains. Let us suppose, in line with our attempt to extend Bohr’s prag-
matic/idealistic interpretation to a realistic one, that the actual events in the
brain occur only at the top level, i.e., at the level of the brain correlates of
our conscious experiences; at the level of the states ψN1 and ψN2 of our earlier
discussion. Then we arrive at the situation referred to by Haldane, Weiner,
and Bohm. In this conception of nature we have, on the one hand, the “poten-
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tia”, which is represented by the evolving Hilbert-space state. It constitutes the
matter-like aspect of nature, in the sense that it is represented in terms of local
quantities that normally evolve deterministically in accordance with local laws
that are direct generalizations of the local laws of classical mechanics. But this
is not the whole story. There are, on the other hand, also the “actual” events
that we experience. These events are represented in Hilbert space by sudden
changes in the state vector. These two aspects of nature are complementary:
it makes no sense to have “tendencies” without having the events that these
tendencies are the tendencies for; and it makes no sense to have separate ex-
periential events with no reality connecting them. These two complementary
aspects of nature interact: each actual event selects certain possibilities from
among the ones generated by the evolving “potentia”. Thus mind is no longer
a causally inert epiphenomenon that can be reduced to the locally specified and
determined matter-like aspects of nature: mind is rather an integral nonlocal
aspect of reality that acts as a unit upon the local deterministic matter-like
aspect of nature, which conditions this mental aspect but does not completely
control it.
This completes my skeletal description of the mathematical basis of the
idea of Haldane and Wiener. I now go on to consider two basic issues: 1), Why
in a quantum universe having no events occurring outside human minds would
different observers agree on what they see? and 2), Why in such a quantum
universe would what they see be describable in classical terms?
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2. Intersubjective Agreement
Within the framework of the quantum mechanical picture of the universe
described above, let us consider the possibility that the events occur only in
conjunction with projection operators P that act nontrivially (i.e., as something
other than a unit operator) only on systems confined to human brains, or similar
organs. In particular, let us suppose that no collapse of a wave function occurs
in connection with a mechanical measuring device. In this situation the question
arises: why do different observers normally agree on what they see; e.g., why do
they all agree that the pointer on a measuring device that they all are observing
has swing, say, to the left, and not to the right?
To discuss this question it is enough to consider just two such observers,
and to relace the state |Ψ > discussed earlier by a state of the form
|Ψ > = a|ψ11 > ⊗|ψ21 > ⊗|ψ3a1 >
⊗ [e|ψ4a1x > +f |ψ4a1y >]
⊗ |ψ3b1 >
⊗ [g|ψ4b1z > +h|ψ4b1w >]
+ b|ψ12 > ⊗|ψ22 > ⊗|ψ3a2 >
⊗ [p|ψ4a2u > +q|ψ4a2v >]
⊗ |ψ3b2 >
⊗ [r|ψ4b2c > +s|ψ4b2d >]. (2.1)
Here |ψ11 > and |ψ12 > are, as before, the two pertinent states of the atom;
|ψ21 > and |ψ22 > are the two corresponding states of the measuring device
(e.g., |ψ21 >∼ the pointer has swung to the left: |ψ22 >∼ the pointer has
swung to the right); |ψ3aj > and |ψ3bj > are the states associated with the early
(unconscious) processing parts of the nervous systems of the observers “a” and
“b” having registered ψ2j , for j = 1 or 2.
The states |ψ4a1x > and |ψ4a1y > are two alternative possible brain cor-
relates that have arisen in the brain of observer “a” from the lower-level state
|ψ3a1 >. The doubling of the possibilities arises from the indeterminacy associ-
ated with quantum processes occurring in the brain of observer “a”. Such an
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indeterminacy arises, for example, from quantum processes in the synapses in his
brain.11 Actually, there will be many more than just two such possibilities, but
two is enough to illustrate the point. The other states |ψ4ajk > and |ψ4bjℓ > are
analogous brain correlates of thoughts for observers “a” and “b”, respectively.
Suppose observer “a” has the experience correlated to the brain state |ψ4a1x >.
This experience corresponds to the jump of the state |Ψ > to the state
|Ψ′ >= NP4a1x|Ψ >, (2.2)
where N is the normalization factor that makes
< Ψ′|Ψ′ >= 1, (2.3)
and
P4a1x = |ψ4a1x >< ψ4a1x|
⊗ ∏
s 6=4a
Is, (2.4)
where s runs over the set of systems {1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b)}, and Is is the unit operator
in the Hilbert space corresponding to system s.
The states ψ4ajk for (j, k) 6= (1, x) should be orthogonal to ψ4a1x, because
under this condition ψ4ajk and ψ4a1x are the brain correlates of definitely distin-
guishable experiences:
< ψ4ajk|ψ4a1x >= δj1δkx. (2.5)
More generally,
< ψmcik|ψndjℓ >= δmnδcdδijδkℓ. (2.6)
But then the conditions (2.1) through (2.6) imply that the state |Ψ′ >, which
is the state that exists just after the occurrence of the experiential event of
observer “a” that is correlated to |ψ4ax1 >, is
|Ψ′ > = |ψ11 > ⊗|ψ21 > ⊗|ψ3a1 > ⊗|ψ4a1x >
⊗ |ψ3b1 >
⊗ [g|ψ4b1z > +h|ψ4b1w >]. (2.7))
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At this stage of the sequential process of actualization no selection has yet
been made between the two states |ψ4b1z > and |ψ4b1w >: i.e., observer “b” has
not yet had his experience pertaining to the position of the pointer. But both of
the possibilities available to him, namely |ψ4b1z > and |ψ4b1w >, have j = 1, and
hence correspond to his seeing the pointer in the position specified by j = 1:
both possibilities correspond to his seeing the pointer swung to the left. Thus
both observers will agree that the pointer has swung to the left: intersubjective
agreement is automatically assured by the quantum formalism.
According to the basic postulate (1.2), the probability for this event cor-
related to |ψ4a1x > to occur is |a|2|e|2. If, contrary to the supposition made at
the beginning of this section, there had been a prior event associated with the
action of the device (i.e., a projection onto P21|Ψ >)) then, according to (1.2),
the probability for this prior event to occur would have been |a|2. Under the
condition that this prior event did occur, the probability for the occurrence of
the subsequent experiential event correlated to |ψ4a1x > would be |e|2. Thus the
probability for this final event to occur is |a|2|e|2 in both cases: the probability
for the occurrence of the experiential event does not depend upon whether the
prior event at the level of the device occurred or not ! Thus there is, in this
example, (as in general) no empirical evidence to support the idea that an event
occurs at the level of the device.
If we assume, in spite of this complete lack of any supporting evidence,
that an event at the level of the device does in fact occur then the question
arises: why does the jump take the device either to the state |ψ21 > or to the
state |ψ22 >, rather than to some linear combination of them? Why should the
classically describable states |ψ21 > and |ψ22 > be singled out at the level of the
quantum mechanical device itself, before any involvement or interaction with a
potential human observer has occurred.
Of course, one can permit this prior event to occur without altering the
probabilities associated with our experiences. Hence at some practical level one
may wish to assume, or pretend, that this event at the level the device does
occur. But in a realistic context, as opposed to a pragmatic one, this fact
that this extra jump could occur without altering the propensities pertaining
to our human experiences does not seem to be a sufficient reason for Nature
to make this jump. If Nature should, nevertheless, choose to make a jump at
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the level of the device then why should she choose to actualize just a single
one of the classically describable states, |ψ21 > or |ψ22 >, rather than some
linear superposition of them? Jumps to such superpositions would, to be sure,
alter the empirically validated predictions of quantum theory. Hence we know
empirically that jumps to such linear combinations do not occur. But in a
realistic setting there should be a general physical principle that dictates which
kind of states are actualized by the quantum jumps, and the fact that we cannot,
in practice, detect the occurrence of certain kinds events is not a satisfactory
general principle: it is based practical considerations rather than basic structure,
and is too anthropocentric.
Because events occurring at the level of the devices must have a classical
character that is hard to explain within a naturalistic framework, and because
there is absolutely no empirical evidence to support the idea that events occur
at this level, we are led to examine the more parsimonious assumption that the
quantum events or jumps (i.e., the abrupt reductions of the quantum states)
are associated primarily only with more complex systems, such as brains and
similar organs: such jumps, by themselves, are sufficient to explain all of the
scientifically accepted empirical evidence available to us today. But then a
similar question arises: why, in a realistic framework, should the brain events
associated with the perceptions of external objects correspond to experiences
of objects that are classically describable if these objects themselves, before
they are perceived, are represented by superpositions of such states? That is,
although we know, on empirical grounds, within the framework of our theory,
and to the extent that the structure of each experience mirrors12 the structure of
its brain correlate, that the events at the level of brain correlates of perceptions
must actualize brain states that have classically describable aspects, nevertheless
the question arises: why should classical conditions be singled out in this way
within a quantum universe? Is there something intrinsically classical about the
character of possible perceptions; something that then forces any brain correlate
that mirrors one of these perceptions to have corresponding classical aspects?
That is, must we resort at this stage to some essentially metaphysical reason?
Or, on the contrary, can the classical character of the brain events, and hence
of mirroring thoughts, be deduced from strictly physical consideration alone?
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3. Consciousness and Survival
William James observed that “the study of the phenomena of consciousness
which we shall make throughout this book shows us that consciousness is at all
times primarily a selecting agency.”13 Note that this conclusion is based on a
survey of phenomena, rather than on our immediate subjective feelings.
Our most important and rudimentary choices, such as fight or flight, have
to do with our survival. Thus from a naturalistic, or purely physical, point of
view the character of consciousness ought to be a consequence of evolutionary
pressures.
Within the framework of classical mechanics no such connection is possible,
for in that framework the entire course of natural history is completely fixed
by microscopic considerations involving only particles and local fields. Any
additional structures that we might care to identify, as “realities” are, insofar as
they are efficacious, completely reducible to these microscopic ones, and hence
are, as far as the dynamical development of any system is concerned, completely
gratuitous: how they are constructed from, or are related to, the elementary
microscopic realities, or whether they exist at all, has no bearing on the survival
of any organism. But within the framework of quantum mechanics developed
here consciousness does have a causally efficacious role that is tied directly to
the selections of courses of action: consciousness is a bone fide selecting agency.
Thus it becomes at least logically possible within the quantum framework to link
the character of human consciousness to the evolutionary pressures for human
survival.
Considerations of wholeness led Haldane to suggest that mind is linked to
resonance phenomenoma. This intuition has been revived by Crick and Koch14,
who suggest that the empirically observed15 40 Hertz frequencies that lock to-
gether electrical activities in widely separated parts of the brain is associated
with consciousness. I shall accept this general idea of a resonance type of activ-
ity involving widely separated parts of the brain as a characteristic of the brain
correlate of a conscious thought, although the idea of an “attractor” would do
just as well. Since energy is available in the brain, the feed-back resonance of a
public address system is a suitable metaphor.16
Generally a superposition several alternative possible “resonant” or “at-
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tractor” states will emerge from the quantum dynamics.11,12 This is illustrated
by the different states ψ4a1x and ψ4a1y in (2.1). These alternative possible states
have certain “classical” aspects: riding on a chaotic ocean of microscopic activ-
ity there will be certain collective variables that are relatively stable and slowly
changing, and that can be called the macroscopic variables of the system. They
will be the variables of classical electromagnetism: charge densities, electric field
strengths, etc., and they are defined by averaging over regions that are small
compared to the brain, but large compared to atoms. The states ψ4a1x and ψ4a1y ,
or, more accurately, the projection operators P[4a1x] and P[4a1y] corresponding to
collections of many micro states subsumed under the macroscopic characteris-
tics identified by the symbols [4a1x] and [4a1y], will be characterized in terms of
these macroscopic (classical) variables. These macro-variables will contain both
the information pertaining to the location of the pointer on the external device
(specified here by j = 1), and also the additional macroscopic specifications
labelled by the indices x and y. Notice that a sum P of orthogonal projection
operators Pi,
P =
∑
i
Pi PiPj = δijPi,
is a projection operator: P 2 = P . Hence the quantum rules described above
apply to these operators P[4a1x] and P[4a2y] that are formed as sums over sets of
orthogonal operators Pi that meet the indicated specifications.
Two questions now arise. The first is this: why should evolutionary pres-
sures tend to force the events in brains to correspond to projection operators
P that project onto “resonance” or “attractor” states that involve large parts
of the brain, and many neurons, rather than, say, to projection operators that
project onto macroscopically specified states of individual neurons?
The second question is this: why, if the evolutionary pressures do tend to
force the brain events to correspond to large structures, such as large-scale res-
onances or attractors, do they not tend to force the events even further in the
direction of largeness, and allow them to correspond to superpositions of clas-
sically describable macroscopically specified states, instead of individual ones.
These two questions are addressed in the following two sections.
18
4. Survival Advantage of Having Only Top-Level Events.
A principal task of the brain is to form templates for possible impending
actions. Each such template is conceived here to be resonance or attractor state
that involves activity that is spread out over a large part of the brain. The
evolutionary pressure for survival should tend to promote the emergence of a
brain dynamics that will produce the rapid formation of such top-level states.
However, as will be discussed in this section, the occurrence of quantum events
at lower levels (e.g., at the levels of individual neurons, or smaller structures) will
act as a source of noise that will tend to inhibit the maximally efficient formation
of these top-level states. Thus the evolutionary pressure for survival will tend
to force the events in brains to occur preferentially at the higher level, i.e., to
actualize mainly the top-level states. Each of our conscious thoughts seems to
have only the information that is present in the part of the brain state that is
actualized by one of these top-level events.12 Hence it is natural to postulate12
that the top-level states actualized by quantum events are precisely the brain
correlates of our conscious thoughts.
In the simple example examined earlier there was a separation at each of
the N−1 macroscopic levels into two macroscopically distinct branches, labelled
by j = 1 or 2, and there was consequently a natural way to define the projection
operators Pn1 and Pn2 at the lower levels that were effectively equivalent, within
that measurement context, to the two final projection operators PN1 and PN2
that were directly associated with the two distinct classically describable expe-
riences. However, if we try to trace back through the brain dynamics to find
the lower-level projection operators that are equivalent to the ones associated
with top-level events then we would find operators that are neither simple nor
natural. Moreover, there would be no rationale for projecting at some lower
level onto precisely the low-level brain states that would eventually lead to the
various distinct top-level states.
There is, on the other hand, a widely held notion that brain activity is basi-
cally classical at the level of neuron firings, so that there never is a superposition
of, for example, a state in which some neuron is firing and a state in which it is
not firing.
To reconcile this intuitive idea with our realistically formulated quantum
mechanics we would need to have low-level events that would prevent quantum
superpositions of distinct classically describable states of individual neurons from
developing, or persisting. There is, however, a problem in implementating this
idea. The processes occurring in brains depend upon the probability densities
for various atoms and ions to be in various places at various times. These
densities are essentially continuous in quantum theory, and this makes the brain
dynamics essentially continuous: a neuron can fire a little sooner, or a little
later, or a little more strongly or weakly, etc. The quantum propensities define,
therefore, only an amorphous structure, insofar as no events occur. But then
the question is: how, in this initially amorphous situation, does one introduce
a set of events (quantum jumps or collapses) that will keep the lower level
(i.e., neuronal) situation essentially classical? How does one characterize the
appropriate low-level projection operators Pi onto classical states in cases where
the quantum dynamics itself does not separate the state into classically distinct
and non overlapping low-level branches? The “measurement” situation discussed
earlier is essentially misleading, if applied to the present case, because it did
not involve this problem of reducing an amorphous quantum state that is not
already decomposed into well separated “classical” parts into a description that
is essentially classical.
A way of dealing with this problem was proposed in ref. 17. It is based on
coherent states.18,19 For any complex number z = (q + ip)/
√
2 let |z > define a
state whose wave function in (a one-dimensional) coordinate space is
ψz(x) =< x|z >= pi−1/4eipxe− 12 (x−q)2 . (4.1)
This state is normalized,
< z|z >= ∑
x
< z|x >< x|z >= 1, (4.2)
and it satisfies the important property ,
∫
dz
pi
|z >< z| ≡
∫
dpdq
2pi
|z >< z|
≡∑
z
|z >< z| ≡∑
z
Pz = I, (4.3)
where “I” is again the identity or unit operator.
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A transformation that takes a density operator ρ that describes a slowly
varying state into an “equivalent” statistical mixture of “classical” states |z >
is
ρ→ ρ′ = ∑
z
PzρPz. (4.4)
This mixture ρ′ is “equivalent” to ρ in the sense that if < x|ρ|x′ > is a slowly
varying function of its two variables x and x′, on the scale of the unit interval
that characterizes the width of the “classical” states |z >, then, for any z′, one
has
< z′|ρ|z′ >≈< z′|ρ′|z′ > . (4.5)
Proof:
< z′|ρ′|z′ >
=
∑
z
< z′|z >< z|ρ|z >< z|z′ >
≈∑
z
< z′|z >< z′|ρ|z′ >< z|z′ >
=< z′|ρ|z′ >,
where the fact that < z′|z > is strongly peaked at z′ = z is used. Thus the trans-
formation from ρ to ρ′ leaves the diagonal (and the nearly diagonal) elements
of < x|ρ|x′ > approximately unchanged, but changes ρ to a classically inter-
pretable mixture of states that are localized in coordinate space, on a certain
(unit) scale.
The relationship
Trρ′ = Trρ (4.6)
also hold.
Proof:
∑
x
< x|ρ′|x >
=
∑
x
∑
z
< x|z >< z|ρ|z >< z|x >
=
∑
z
< z|ρ|z > ∑
x
< z|x >< x|z >
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=
∑
z
∑
x
∑
x′
< z|x >< x|ρ|x′ >< x′|z >
=
∑
x
∑
x′
< x|ρ|x′ >< x′|x >
=
∑
x
< x|ρ|x > .
Suppose the dynamics is such as to generate and sustain a state |0 > (i.e.,
|z = 0 >) that is a component of a top-level resonant state. The property of
the dynamics to sustain the state |0 >, but to cause states orthogonal to it to
dissipate, is expressed by the conditions
U(t)|0 >= |0 >, (4.7)
for all t > 0, where U(t) is the unitary operator that generates the evolution
from time zero to time t, and for each pair (z′, z)
< z′|U(t)(I − P0)|z >=⇒ 0, (4.8)
where P0 = |0 >< 0|, and the double arrow signifies the large-time limit. Then
for any pair (z′, z′′) we have, by virtue of (4.8) and (4.7), (and assuming that
< z|ρ and ρ|z > tend to zero for large |z|),
< z′|U(t)ρU †(t)|z′′ >,
=⇒ < z′|P0ρP0|z′′ >
= < z′|0 >< 0|ρ|0 >< 0|z′′ > (4.9)
Similarly, for any pair (z′, z′′) and slowly varying ρ,
< z′|U(t)ρ′U †(t)|z′′ >
=
∑
z
< z′|U(t)|z >< z|ρ|z >< z|U †(t)|z′′ >
=⇒∑
z
< z′|0 >< 0|z >< z|ρ|z >< z|0 >< 0|z′′ >
≈∑
z
< z′|0 >< 0|z >< 0|ρ|0 >< z|0 >< 0|z′′ >
= < z′|0 >< 0|ρ|0 >< 0|z′′ > . (4.10)
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Thus the change from ρ to ρ′ makes little difference in these matrix elements:
the statistical mixture of classical states ρ′ have approximately the same matrix
elements as the original ρ.
After some finite time, however, an originally smooth ρ will, by virtue of
(4.7) and (4.8), develop a classical component proportional to |0 >< 0| = P0
that will stand out from the smooth background. Consider, therefore, the effect
of the dynamics on ρ and ρ′ for this part of ρ proportional to ρ0 = P0:
< z′|U(t)ρ0U †(t)|z′′ >
=⇒ < z′|0 >< 0|z′′ >, (4.11)
whereas
< z′|U(t)ρ′0U †(t)|z′′ >
=
∑
z
< z′|U(t)|z >< z|0 >
× < 0|z >< z|U †(t)|z′′ > (4.12)
=⇒∑
z
< z′|0 >< 0|z >< z|0 >< 0|z >< z|0 >< 0|z′′ >
= < z′|0 >< 0|z′′ > ×∑
z
(< 0|z >< z|0 >)2. (4.13)
But
0 < (< 0|z >< z|0 >) < 1 for all z 6= 0 (4.14)
and ∑
z
< 0|z >< z|0 >= 1. (4.15)
Hence ∑
z
(< 0|z >< z|0 >)2 < 1. (4.16)
Thus the effect of introducing the events that convert ρ to the classical approx-
imation ρ′ has the effect of disrupting the preservation of the state |0 >: the
probability of staying in this “preferred” state is diminished by the effects of
introducing the low-level events.
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Although this result was obtained under simplifying assumptions that al-
lowed us easily to compute the effect, the conclusion is general. It arises essen-
tially from the fact that the transformation ρ → ρ′ “flattens out” a bump in ρ
that is already of a classical size, and hence inhibits the emergence of a single
classical state from an amorphous background.
The problem, in the general context, is this: the quantum dynamics can
be such that certain resonance states (preferred for their survival advantages)
will emerge from an amorphous backgrounds of quantum probabilities. (See ref.
16). Each of these resonance states will be a collective phenomena involving
many neurons. The emerging resonant state will be characterized by specific
relationships in the timing of the firings of the various neurons. The incipient
resonances can generate bumps, but it is not known to the system beforehand
which specific combinations of firing timings will eventually emerge from the
smooth quantum soup via the complex feed-back mechanisms.
The quantum dynamics allows such self-generating states to emerge from
the amorphous quantum soup with a certain maximal efficiency, because all of
the possible overlapping configurations of classical possibilities are simultane-
ously present, and their consequences are simultaneously explored by the quan-
tum dynamics. After the dynamics has generated an output consisting of a
superposition of distinct classical top-level resonating states then an event can
occur that will select one of these top-level possibilities without interfering with
the dynamics that has just generated the various top-level possibilities. But if
events are required to occur at a lower level, in order to impose the condition of
classical describability there, then, in order to maintain the maximal efficiencies
for the production of the top-level states, these events would have to project
upon states that have optimal relationships among the timings of the firings
of the neurons. But these timings are not yet known to the system. The in-
troduction of a statistically distributed set of low-level events can achieve the
demanded reduction to a classical description at the low level, as in our example,
but this disruption of the quantum dynamics will undoubtedly, just as it did in
our example, inject into the evolution of the system an element of noise that will
tend to reduce the efficiency of generating and sustaining the top-level states.
Physicists have, today, no idea of what, if any, property of a system deter-
mines the level at which the “events” associated with this system occur. But
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within a naturalistic setting this level should be determined by some charac-
teristic of that system itself. If this is true, then the arguments given above
would lead to the conclusion that evolutionary pressures should cause brains
to evolve in such a way as to shift the events occurring in alert brains to the
top level, thus leaving the dynamics at the neuronal level and below controlled
by the local deterministic quantum law of evolution, namely the Schroedinger
equation. This resolves the logical problem of how to tie the description of the
behavior of the neurons in a rational way to the description of the intertwined
chemical processes that are so crucial to their functioning. The solution: use the
quantum description throughout, making full use, of course, of the approximate
validity of classical concepts entailed by the decoherence-type effects illustrated
in equation (5.4) below.
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5. Classical Description
Classical concepts have entered in an important way into the above de-
scription of the process of actualization of the quantum states: the projection
operators associated with the events have been characterized by classically de-
scribable conditions on certain macroscopic variables. The question thus arises:
why should classical concepts enter at all into the evolution of the quantum uni-
verse? Why should the quantum events project onto states in which the values
of macroscopic field variables at spacetime points are confined to small domains,
instead of projecting onto superpositions of such classically describable states?
Here again an answer based on the survival of the species can be given. It
is tied to the local character of the interaction and the concept of symbol.
A symbol is a physical structure that can be “interpreted” by a mechanism:
the mechanism gives a characteristic response to the symbol. In our model
the various actualized states in the brain, the brain correlates of thoughts, act
as symbols. These states are characterized by definite values of macroscopic
classical-type variables, and the motor responses are determined in large measure
by classically describable reactions to the classically describable inputs provided
by these symbols. But then the question is: why should the quantum events
actualize states having this special classical character instead of superpositions
of such states?
To find the answer suppose that the brain has evolved to a point where
the brain correlates have been generated, and that for simplicity, these states
are just two in number. Let these two brain correlates be denoted by |ϕ1 >
and |ϕ2 >. These two states are supposed to be characterized by macroscopic
variables that are significantly different. Consequently, these two states will,
because of the local character of the interaction, very quickly generate greatly
differing (orthogonal) states in the embedding ocean of microscopic variables:
the brain will, to a very good approximation, evolve to a state of the form
|ψ >= a|ϕ1 > |χ1 > +b|ϕ2 > |χ2 >, (5.1)
where the states |χ1 > and |χ2 > are orthogonal states in the imbedding space
of microscopic degrees of freedom.
The importance of states such as (5.1) is that the significant information
is concentrated into the classical level of description, i.e., in the states |ϕ1 >
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and |ϕ2 >, and this macroscopically represented information can control, in
large measure, the ongoing evolution via the laws of classical physics. This
provides the evident evolutionary advantage in having the events correspond to
projection operators that act at the level of the macrovariables, for then the
consequences of the selection associated with an event can be largely governed
by deterministic classical laws. But the question before us now is whether there
could be any additional advantage in having the events correspond to operators
that project onto superpositions of such macrostates.
In the present simple example the question is whether it could be advanta-
geous to have events that correspond to projection operator such as
P = (c|ϕ1 > +d|ϕ2 >)(c∗ < ϕ1|+ d∗ < ϕ2|)× Iχ (5.2)
with cd 6= 0.
The density operator in our example is
ρ = |ψ >< ψ|, (5.3)
with |ψ > defined in (5.1). Our first observation is that
TrPρ = TrPρ′, (5.4)
where
ρ′ = |a|2|ϕ1 > |χ1 >< χ1| < ϕ1|
+ |b|2|ϕ2 > |χ2 >< χ2| < ϕ2|. (5.5)
Proof:
TrPρ
=
∑
x
< x|(c|ϕ1 > +d|ϕ2 >)(c∗ < ϕ1|+ d∗ < ϕ2|)
× (a|ϕ1 > |χ1 > +b|ϕ2 > |χ2 >)
× (a∗ < ϕ1| < χ1|+ b∗ < ϕ2| < χ2|)|x >
= (c∗ < ϕ1|+ d∗ < ϕ2|)
× (a|ϕ1 > |χ1 > +b|ϕ2 > |χ2 >)
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× (a∗ < ϕ1| < χ1|+ b∗ < ϕ2| < χ2|)
× (c|ϕ1 > +d|ϕ2 >)
= c∗aa∗c+ d∗bb∗d
= |a|2|c|2 + |b|2|d|2
= TrPρ′. (5.6)
This means that the probability for the occurrence of the event associated with
P is the same for the density operator ρ′ as it is for ρ.
Given the fact the information available for determining the subsequent
(macroscopically controlled) dynamics is contained in ρ′, what is the form of
P that least degrades this information? The answer is P with cd = 0: the P
should be either |ϕ1 >< ϕ1| or |ϕ2 >< ϕ2|.
For example, if |ϕ1 > corresponds to a very good choice for the organism,
and |ϕ2 > a very poor one, so that a well conditioned brain will give a ρ with
|a|2 ≃ 1 and |b|2 ≃ 0, and if the P is given by (5.2) with |c|2 = |d|2 = 1/2 then
(5.6) shows that all the information about |a|2 and |b|2 will be lost: the result
is 1/2(|a|2 + |b|2) = 1/2 independently of |a|2 and |b|2. This special example
already suggests the answer: P should be either |ϕ1 >< ϕ1| or |ϕ2 >< ϕ2|, in
order to retain all the information. Any other choice causes a degradation of the
information generated by the brain dynamics. In general, the optimal choice for
the P is that it should be one of a set of P ’s each of which projects onto a single
one of the classically described states generated by the brain dynamics: other-
wise some information generated by the brain will be lost, and the likelihood
that the organism will survive will be diminished.
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6. Inequivalence of Other Ontological Interpretations
There is an alternative interpretation of quantum theory that can be con-
strued as an ontology — i.e., as a putative description of nature herslf —
but in which there are no collapse events. This is Everett’s “many-minds”
interpretation.20 In this interpretation there is no natural place to introduce the
mental events because nothing ever “happens”: the entire course of history is
continuously laid out on a spacetime plot, with no clear notion of any “ actual
happenings” or events.
It is difficult, and I think impossible, to give any rational meaning to “prob-
ability” in an Everett world where there are no definite happenings or events.
Indeed, because the components of a superposition must be combined conjunc-
tively — since in principle they can interfere with each other — each of the
possibilities present in the evolving state of the universe must exist together
with every other one. Hence they cannot have the independent probabilities for
coming into existence that is allowed for the elements of a disjunctive combina-
tion of possibilities. Indeed, all of the branches of the state vector are supposed
to exist in unison. The mere fact that that this physical state can be sepa-
rated into a superposition of components that correspond to noncommunicating
realms of experience, or to distinct recorded histories, does not, by itself, make
the probabilities for the coming into existence of these various physical com-
ponents any different from the single probability of the whole of which they
are the simultaneously existing parts, or from the probabilities that these parts
would have if the associated experiential realms were not completely noncom-
municating. Yet, for empirical reasons, tiny probabilities must often be assigned
to some branches and large probabilities to others, even though all of them exist
in unison, according to the Everett view.
The only apparent rational way to reconcile these requirement is to intro-
duce into the ontology some entities, besides the quantum state itself, for the
probabilities to refer to. To make the necessary tie-in to empirical data these
must correspond in some way to growing historical experiencable records that are
allowed to prolong themselves into the future in alternative possible ways, with
the alternative possibilities populating the different branches of the state vector
of the evolving universe. Then the model becomes endowed with ‘happenings’,
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namely the selections or choices of the prolongations of each of these histories
into the future, and, correspondingly, with choices between the simultaneously
existing branches of the state vector.
The probabilities for these events are supposed to be governed by the quan-
tum rules. However, in the Everett framework these events do not influence
the evolution of the quantum state: the influence or control is unidirectional,
from the quantum state to the events. Thus everything is controlled by the
Schroedinger equation except for individual choices, which, however, are buried
in a population whose statistical properties are controlled by the locally de-
terministic Schroedinger equation. Thus, within this framework, no arguments
based on survival of organisms can be used to determine just where to locate
the particular physical activities in our brains that correspond to our thoughts.
Any placement would be equivalent, as far as survival is concerned, to any other
one, because the placement is not connected to any difference in the dynamical
evolution of the statistical ensemble that constitutes the full system: just as in
classical mechanics, the evolution of the full system is completely deterministic,
and is independent of where, in the dynamical unfolding, nature chooses to place
the physical correlate of the epiphenomenal consciousness.
Likewise in Bohm’s nonlocal deterministic ontological model21 the place-
ment of the nonefficacious consciousness within the deterministically evolving
universe has no effect upon the course of nature, and hence none upon the su-
vival of the species. Hence the mechanisms for the evolution of consciousness
discussed here cannot be operative in either of these alternative frameworks,
essentially because consciousness is not efficacious in these models
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7. Conclusions
It was suggested by Haldane and Weiner, shortly after the birth of quan-
tum mechanics, that this profoundly deepened understanding of the nature of
matter allows mind to be liberated from the epiphenomenal status assigned to
it by classical mechanics, and to become, instead, an aspect of nature that is
interactive with, rather than subservient to, the local deterministic matter-like
aspect of nature that was mistakenly identified as the entire physical universe by
classical mechanics. This suggestion of Haldane and Weiner remains viable to-
day and, indeed, is being vigorously pursued. Haldane’s further suggestion that
mind is associated with a resonance phenomena has been revived by Crick and
Koch, without its quantum foundation, and is the basis one of today’s premier
research programs on the mind-brain problem.
If the level of brain dynamics at which the quantum event occurs is de-
termined by the physical characteristics of that organ itself, then there should
exist effective evolutionary pressures that will tend to raise this level to the
top level, which is characterized as the formation of macroscopic templates for
possible impending action in which classically describable aspects, expressed in
terms of the macroscopic variables of classical electrodynamics, form symbols for
the activation of processes that, at least in the case of motor processes, remain
largely controlled by macroscopic variables acting in accordance with classical
laws. The general brain process will remain essentially quantum mechanical.
On the other hand, due to the local character of the interaction, there will also
be evolutionary pressure for the top-level event not to go beyond the classically
describable level to the level of superpositions of classically describable states.
Thus the classical character of our thoughts, if assumed to mirror the relational
structures specified by the projection operators P associated with the corre-
sponding brain events12, can be naturally explained within the mathematical
framework of quantum mechanics.
This evolution-based explanation of the classical character of our thoughts,
and hence of the observed physical world itself, is independent of whether or not
classically describable events occur at the level of mechanical measuring devices.
Although the argument given above was specialized to the human organ-
ism, it applies equally well to all organisms whose structure is governed by
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evolutionary pressures for survival: the general conclusion would be that in all
such organisms the freedom that inheres in each of its component subsystems
to make quantum choices should be suppressed to the extent that such choices
interfere with the quantum process of the organism as a whole to create top-level
templates for possible actions, and that there should be in all such organisms
top-level events each of which actualizes one of the templates for possible action
generated by the local-deterministic part of the quantum dynamical process.
The way in which the selected event is singled out from all the other possibili-
ties generated by the quantum dynamics is not yet a part of what science has
revealed to us.
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